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Introduction 
The unprecedented freedom which our society 
offers its members has arrived…together with 
unprecedented impotence.  
Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity 
  
The amount of “choice” in the U.S. at the onset of the 21st century largely seems 
unbounded. Indeed, the variety of choices offered to most Americans seems to lend 
credence to the idea of having reached an unprecedented stage of personal freedom and 
new heights of individual liberty. This seeming freedom, however, has unfurled 
concomitantly with widening economic disparities and persistent racial, gender, and 
sexual inequalities, compelling recognition that, in spite of the expanse of choices laid 
out before us, very little seems to have fundamentally change. Indeed, as Zygmunt 
Bauman argues: 
 
 Contemporary society has given to the ‘hospitality to critique’ an entirely new 
 sense and has invented a way to accommodate critical thought and action while 
 remaining immune to the consequences of that accommodation, and so emerging 
 unaffected and unscathed—reinforced rather than weakened—from the tests and 
 trials of the open-house policy (Bauman 23). 
 
Unprecedented proliferation of individual choice at the expense of growing economic and 
social inequalities has proven to be a critical feature of the economic, political, and 
cultural project of neoliberalism, emerging in the midst of the 1970s economic downturn 
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and continuing to dominate the twenty-first century social landscape; choice in the terms 
of the pro-business ethic of neoliberalism, then, usually digresses to consumer choice and 
is limited as such.  
 To understand how contemporary social critique and change has been stunted in 
spite of novel freedoms of choice, it is helpful to look at dominant methods of social 
activism since the end of the 20th century. Lobbyist and litigation organizations like the 
Public Interest Research Groups (the PIRGs) provide insight into the operations of social 
activism in the midst of neoliberalization. Thus, through contextualizing the PIRGs and 
similar lobbyist organizations within the neoliberal shift of the 1970s and understanding 
how their approach effectively plays within the terms of neoliberalism through 
commodifying political and social involvement, we can demonstrate how this popular 
approach is problematic to the incitement of radical social change within the U.S.   
 
The Rise of Neoliberalism 
 To understand and effectively critique the PIRGs’ approach to social justice and 
change, it is first necessary to situate the organization historically within the dominant 
social, economic, and political structures taking root in late in the twentieth century and 
shaping our cultural, economic, and political landscape today. 
 Social theorist Zygmunt Bauman suggests that we are currently entering an 
unprecedented stage of “liquid modernity” in which social relations and institutions that 
formerly had a sense of permanency and solidity are disintegrating and entering states of 
perpetual flux. Though this sense of liquidity has consistently been a defining 
characteristic of modernity, distinguishing it from previous eras, Bauman argues that this 
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ostensible “second modernity” is novel in its radical liberation of business and enterprise 
(Bauman 2); it is through this increased liberalization of markets that social relations and 
institutions undergo reconstitution to support rapidly changing market trends catering to a 
society of individuals. This consequent sense of unprecedented individual freedom to 
choose and act through enterprise and consumerism legitimizes and further entrenches 
the economic as the unwieldy basis upon which social and political institutions are built 
or destroyed, posing new issues to the ideas of social criticism and transformation.  
 This liquidity, however, is nothing new to modern social formations. The onset of 
modernity is marked by a “profaning of the sacred” or “disavowing and dethroning the 
past, and first and foremost ‘tradition’” (Bauman 4). Social relations and systems of 
obligations and loyalties that were considered irrelevant to the rational operations of 
enterprise were broken apart. This “melting of the solids” indicated the liberation of 
business enterprise from the network of social, familial, and ethical obligations within 
which it was previously implicated, leaving social bonds and formations open to the 
determining force of the economy. As Bauman puts it: 
  
[The economic], now the “basis” of social life, gave all life’s other realms the 
status of “superstructure”—to wit, an artifact of the “basis” whose sole function 
was to service its smooth and continuing operation. (Bauman 4) 
  
 Thus, modernity is characterized by the constant cycle of breaking down social 
formations and obligations to allow for greater economic flexibility and the subsequent 
recasting of social structures and networks according to those economic forces. This 
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process is evident in the emergence of systems of class from the structure of familial 
estates and hereditary ownership in the nineteenth century. Bauman argues that, again, we 
are undergoing a shift as the solids of our current social structure are in the process of 
being melted. This time, however, it occurs at the micro level of social cohabitation—the 
individual and his/her involvement in collective projects and actions (Bauman 13). 
 Decidedly, Bauman posits, our form of modernity is characterized by deregulation 
and privatization, whose social effects he describes in the following way: 
  
What used to be considered a job to be performed by human reason seen as the 
 collective endowment and property of the human species has been fragmented 
 (‘individualized’), assigned to individual guts and stamina, and left to individuals’ 
 management and individually administered resources (29). 
  
 Essentially, this “second modernity” can be understood most clearly as a 
liquefaction of the collective and mutual responsibility in favor of the individual and 
individual freedom, and this process can be viewed as a product as well as a tool of a 
larger project of deregulation and liberalization of trade and business, a “releasing of the 
brakes” on the financial sector.  
  
 This push toward increased liberation of trade and business effectively began at 
the onset of the 1970s, with the breaking down of the Keynesian, state-interventionist 
economic policies that had reigned on the political and economic landscape since the 
Depression era. With rising rates of inflation and unemployment, alternatives were called 
  
6 
for to avoid inevitable depression; the interests of liberating corporations and businesses 
from state control and regulation began coming to the fore of economic discussions. This 
program of free market policy had been fomenting in the margins of economic and 
political discourse since the 1940s, and it could likely be understood as a response to 
growing global as well as national trends toward socialism, communism, and even 
anarchism, which advocated radical resource redistribution.  
 As geographer David Harvey puts it, proponents and creators of this economic 
program labeled themselves “neoliberals,” maintaining “a fundamental commitment to 
ideals of personal freedom” through an adherence to free market principles of economics; 
these principles worked, ideally, in opposition to any state intervention in the economy as 
well as any centralized state planning (Harvey 20). From its inception, neoliberal theory 
held individual freedom as the primary value of civilization itself--maintained through 
rule of law--and proposed free market economics as the means of expanding and 
preserving this freedom, thus casting all other potential social and economic 
organizations as suspect in values. This sentiment is clearly reflected in the founding 
statement of the Mont Pelerin Society, the group of economists and philosophers who 
first expounded this theory: 
 
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s 
surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already 
disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of 
current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary 
group  are progressively undermined by the extension of arbitrary power. Even 
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that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and 
expression, is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of 
tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of 
power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own  
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth 
of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth 
of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that 
they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the 
competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with 
these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be 
effectively preserved (Harvey 20). 
 
 As the U.S. entered into uncertain financial times in the 1970s, at the heels of 
some of the largest radical social movements in U.S. history, the possibility of a 
reconfiguration of politics and economics favoring a more socialistic downward wealth 
redistribution became tangible. Harvey argues that economic elites, feeling a palpable 
threat to the capitalistic social order, subscribed heavily to the neoliberal doctrine, which 
reinscribed a fundamental faith in the free market over which they reigned. There is 
strong evidence to support that the neoliberal turn is to some degree associated with the 
restoration of class power and economic elites. Indeed, Harvey posits: 
 
 The redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a 
 persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole 
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 project. (24) 
  
 The definite fear of the disintegration of market policy and the rise of more 
socialistic economic and political tendencies was exemplified by newly appointed 
Supreme Court justice Lewis Powell in 1971. In a memo to Richard Nixon, Powell stated 
that “criticism of and opposition to the US free enterprise system had gone too far and 
that ‘the time had come . . . for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American 
business to be marshaled against those who would destroy it” (Harvey 43). This massive 
revival of business ethics would include political, economic and cultural strategies—
ranging from influence in universities to media and courts—that would “change how 
individuals think ‘about the corporation, the law, culture, and the individual’” (Harvey 
43).  
 A prime example of the implementation of the neoliberal project is the corporate 
turnaround of New York City after its fiscal crisis in the 1970s. After decades of 
deindustrialization and suburbanization, the urban center of the city was in decay, the 
solution to which had previously been to increase public employment and aid. In the 
1970s, however, Nixon reduced federal aid to workers; a powerful group of investment 
bankers then pushed the city into bankruptcy by refusing to bridge the city’s longstanding 
debt. The consequent bail out included the construction of financial institutions that took 
over the city’s budgetary planning, effectively squeezing out the influence of 
democratically elected politicians. The new institutions further reduced public funding to 
education, public health, and transportation, curbing the influence and abilities of labor 
unions and other collective bargaining groups. These austerity measures largely left the 
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working class of New York demoralized and resigned as investment bankers were then 
free to reshape the New York landscape to create a “good business climate”(47). As 
Harvey puts it, this restructuring included selling the city as a cultural center, 
emphasizing “the liberty of consumer choices, not only with respect to particular 
products but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of 
cultural practices.” More succinctly, investment bankers and businesses focused on 
“increasing consumer niche choices” as well as “restoring” or gentrifying neighborhoods, 
effectively marginalizing lower working classes and redistributing wealth and choice to 
those most able to consume already.  
 Thus, under the guise of preserving individual freedom, supporters of neoliberal 
theory launched a political and economic project that, contrary to the theory, included the 
coercion and take over of state apparatuses by financial institutions, which included 
slashing funding for social and public programs and dissolving social solidarities to make 
way for a business ethic. This project and new business ethic not only involved the 
drastic transformation of economic policy and state and public institutions; it also 
contained, as Margaret Thatcher put it, the “object of chang[ing] the soul” (Harvey 23).  
 Increasingly, individual freedom was recast in terms of individual consumer 
choice and people encouraged to conceptualize themselves as consumers in the public 
sphere. This conceptualization is fraught with inequalities as this means “the fullness of 
freedom for those whose income, leisure and security need no enhancing, and a mere 
pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt to make use of their 
democratic rights to gain shelter from the owners of property” (37).  
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The Cultural Politics of (Neo)Liberalism 
 This inequity of the class system is characterized by an unequal distribution of 
wealth, resources, and political power and is underpinned by racism, sexism, and 
heterosexism. These inequalities are often obscured by Liberal capitalist rhetoric, which 
organizes social life through the imposition of arbitrary categories of the state, economy, 
civil society, and the family, which are, in turn, deemed either of public or private 
concern. It is in this distinction between public and private that inequalities--not only of 
wealth and power, but of race, gender, and sexual orientation that cut across the capitalist 
social structure--are masked. Indeed, queer theorist Lisa Duggan, in her book The 
Twilight of Equality: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy, 
argues that racial, gender, and sexual inequalities are deeply embedded in the Liberal 
capitalist social hierarchy: 
 
Neoliberalism, a late twentieth-century incarnation of Liberalism, organizes 
material and political life in terms of race, gender, and sexuality as well as 
economic class and nationality, or ethnicity and religion. But the categories 
through which Liberalism (and thus also neoliberalism) classifies human activity 
and relationships actively obscure the connections among these organizing terms 
(Duggan 3). 
  
 Liberal theory (and, consequently, neoliberal theory) did not emerge, as is often 
presumed, from a neutral, rational space; it developed, as all theories, from a certain 
historical moment rife with general assumptions about race, gender, and sexuality and is, 
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consequently, heavily influenced by those assumptions. As Duggan explains, one of the 
most significant events to happen in the development of Liberalism in the 19th century 
was the elimination of the requirement of property ownership to vote and participate in 
the state; formal equality in the eyes of the state was then given to all white males. Thus, 
participation in the public sphere of the state and civil society was marked by whiteness 
and maleness rather than by economic property rights; subsequently, the economy and 
family were increasingly seen as--at least rhetorically--private (Duggan 5). 
 The argument is remarkable in that it demonstrates how equal public participation 
in the state was understood, as Duggan states, in terms of race and gender, which 
effectively marginalized women, immigrants, and African Americans from involvement 
in the public, political life of the state. Inequalities among race, gender and sexuality in 
the economy and the family were legitimized by marking those categories as private, 
controlled by individual interests and not the state. It is in this way that women were 
structurally subordinated to men, relegated to the heterosexual family which was 
dominated by a male head of household, and blatantly racist institutions, like slavery, 
could be condoned under the private control of the economy. As Duggan puts it, “the 
formal equality of state participation could more easily be defined as distinct from the 
‘natural,’ ‘private,’ inequalities of developing industrial capitalism in the U.S.” (Duggan 
7).  
 Over a century later, our understandings of the political, economic and cultural 
continue to be dominated by Liberal theory; the central analytical debate in Liberalism is 
to determine to what extent the state should be involved in the economy and family life, 
essentially to demarcate the boundaries of what is private and public. This fluctuating 
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boundary of private/public continues to be underpinned by hierarchies of race and gender 
that cut across the class system. Indeed, Duggan points out that the disintegration and 
reduction of social solidarities and federal social safety nets propelled by the corporatism 
of neoliberalism was achieved through valorizing concepts of privatization and personal 
responsibility, which mask inequalities that have become endemic to the capitalist class 
order. Duggan goes so far as to argue that “the goal of raising corporate profits has never 
been pursued separately from the rearticulation of hierarchies of race, gender, and 
sexuality” (Duggan 14). 
 In sum, neoliberal theory ostensibly holds the individual and individual rights as 
sacrosanct and attempts to uphold them, ideally, through greater liberalization of the 
markets, which includes greater privatization of public resources and businesses and less 
state involvement in the presumably private interactions of the economy. However, the 
valorized concepts of privatization and personal responsibility, so central to the rhetoric 
of the neoliberal project, are not socially neutral as they “[join] economic goals with 
cultural values while obscuring the identity politics and upwardly redistributive impetus 
of neoliberalism” (Duggan 14).  
 
Transitions in Activism 
 What does activism look like in the midst of a general breakdown in social 
solidarities and the rise of a new consumerist individualism? Or when broad-based social 
movements dissolve in a growing corporatist practicality? Or during a time in which 
social inequalities are further entrenched and masked through a reified individualism 
advanced by rampant privatization? In their 1979 article “Student Activism in the 1970s: 
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Transformation, Not Decline,” Arthur Levine and Keith Wilson argue that that activism 
looks a lot like the Public Interest Research Groups, a student activist subset of the 
legislation and litigation organizations that Lisa Duggan dubs the “Civil Rights Lobby” 
(Duggan 20). 
 Writing as the 1970s drew to a close—a decade in which the radical 
demonstrations of the 60s had much abated and the student activist was generally 
presumed dead—Levine and Wilson posit that, instead, the 70s bore witness to a radical 
transformation in student activism, indicative of the “evolution of a new mood in the 
nation and on its campuses” (Levine & Wilson 627). This new mood, Levine and Wilson 
argue, could be typified by the successful tax revolt heavily influenced by California 
Republican Howard Jarvis in 1978. 
 Where John F Kennedy could be seen as the “man on horseback” for the 60s era 
of broad social critique and mass demonstrations, Howard Jarvis could be understood as 
that emblematic man for the 70s and the following decades. As Kennedy famously 
challenged the nation to become more active citizens in his inauguration address in 1961, 
the 1978 tax revolt presaged by the passage of Proposition 13 in California could be 
representative of a nation feeling that they were being asked to do too much for their 
country. Proposition 13 effectively made any increases in tax rates on property extremely 
difficult, which in turn cut state and local funding for public resources like libraries, 
public schools, and city services. The bill’s successful passage sparked similar antitax 
sentiments nation-wide and could possibly be a significant contributing factor to Ronald 
Reagan’s election to presidency in 1980.  
 Thus, Howard Jarvis’ emergence as the embodiment of the dominant 1970s 
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cultural ethos marked a significant change in underlying economic, political, and cultural 
currents, as Levine and Wilson state: 
  
Howard Jarvis began preaching his message of individual rights 
contemporaneously with John Kennedy’s exhortation of individual responsibility 
to the community. For the Jarvis philosophy to eclipse the then popular Kennedy 
position has required a fundamental shift in the American world view--a basic 
change in our perception of the American community and our place within it 
(Levine & Wilson 630). 
 
This change, the two writers argue, is indicative of a national rise in individual 
ascendancy, or declining community ascendancy, which they aptly dub “meism”: 
 
This emphasis on ‘me’ is what differentiates periods of individual ascendancy 
from periods of community ascendancy. The former are hedonistic emphasizing 
the primacy of duty to one’s self, and the latter are more ascetic stressing the 
primacy of duty to others. Individual ascendancy is concerned principally with 
rights and community ascendancy with responsibilities (Levine & Wilson 631). 
  
This broad reconceptualization of the self in relation to the community occurring in the 
1970s is represented in descriptions of college students at the end of the decade; the most 
common adjectives used by university faculty to depict the majority of college students in 
1978 were “career-oriented”; “concerned with self”; “concerned with material success”; 
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“well-groomed”; and “practical” (Levine & Wilson 633). These descriptions are 
relatively sedate, stressing an individual concern that stands in rather stark contrast to the 
radical campus unrest and student solidarity prevalent in 1969, a year in which mass 
student protests were ranked among the most pressing issues facing the nation (Levine & 
Wilson 629). It is little wonder, then, that student concerns and methods of activism 
would also undergo radical transformation in response to a growing “meism” in an 
increasingly business-inspired landscape.  
 Student interest groups began emerging prolifically toward the beginning of the 
1970s, employing, as Levine and Wilson argue, “new forms of activism and the 
expansion of several existing types which were not previously considered part of the 
dominant motif of student protest” (Levine & Wilson 633). This included increased 
lobbying and litigation for social change as it particularly pertained to university and 
college student interest. Levine and Wilson hail these techniques as “less dangerous, 
more practical, and more individual” than tactics employed in the 60s and are consistent 
with the shift in national attitudes in the 1970s (Levine & Wilson 635).  
 In keeping with the increasing sense of individual ascendancy, these lobbyist 
groups epitomized the spirit of “meism” in that they were concerned mainly with the 
rights of individuals and focused on improving conditions for single groups of people 
(Levine & Wilson 636). Student interest organizations also represented a splintering of 
student concern from one or two commonly related causes to multiple individual issues to 
be tackled singularly through state apparatuses. Among the most prevalent and influential 
of this growing student lobby were the Public Interest Research Groups.  
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PIRG and Power 
 The Public Interest Research Groups were the brainchild of independent politician 
Ralph Nader and were launched on several college campuses throughout the Northeast in 
1971. Toward the end of the 1960s, Nader began to critically question the structure and 
content of higher education in the US, concerned that students were given few 
opportunities and venues to implement the theories of social change learned in class. In 
his article “Student Power 101”, he argues that the contemporary student has little idea of 
what it means to be an effective citizen, which, he posits, includes knowledge of “how to 
influence city hall, how to relate to Congress . . . and how the tax system operates” 
(Nader 47). Nader acknowledges the powerful influence of corporate interest in politics 
but poses state policy as the ultimate appeal for social change, a view he emphasizes in 
the following way: 
 
Indeed, [students] know next to nothing about how power operates in our society. 
How many political science students have spent a day, a week, or a month  in their 
state capital, seeing how laws are really passed, observing the influences that pull 
and tug on legislators? How many have studied up close the willingness of 
government agencies to ignore their regulatory responsibilities in the face of 
corporate political power (Nader 48).  
  
Thus, as Nader recognizes the threat of a corporatist influence in politics as well as the 
university system, he suggests the formation of a more powerful student lobby to combat 
it, as well as the creation of lucrative careers for post grads in the growing non-profit 
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sector of the economy. This conviction is evident in the structure of PIRG, which, as 
Nader explains, “[applies] student research to real-life issues whose solutions are pursued 
through the legislative process” (Nader 49). In this way, students “[learn] about the 
legislative process, lobbying, and backstage power plays (Nader 50).  
 To generate a successful lobby effort to combat corporate influence in politics, it 
is necessary to define and generate a particular constituency to call upon when needed; 
this constituency must also be conceptualized a particular way within the presumably 
public sphere of the state to have greater political clout. For a fledgling and growing 
PIRG in the 1970s, this constituency consisted predominantly of college students, and 
one of the main goals became “increasing the stature of students in the eyes of the 
legislators, community leaders, and powerful educational bureaucracies” (Senia 28).  
 This process also included creating a firm internal structure for the organization in 
which annual dues were collected from students at a number of campuses; formal 
internships were offered for research, legislation, and litigation experience; and offices 
were staffed with full time directors to ensure the “professional” conduct of all PIRG 
chapters (Senia 30). The ultimate aim was to guarantee that educational leaders and 
politicians hear a student interest voice, and thus recognize “the importance of the student 
‘as a consumer’ and the student ‘as a citizen’” (Senia 31).  
 The New York PIRG (NYPIRG) chapter became particularly prevalent in the 
mid-1970s and provides a typical example of the operations of the organization at that 
time; it also serves as a concrete representation of the activist transformation of the 
decade. The organization essentially materialized Ralph Nader’s desire to combine (as a 
reviewer of the organization in the 1970s put it) “the twin tenets of educational reform 
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and social change into a student-based group that would conduct consumer price surveys 
and sales fraud studies and push for legislative reform measure and voice environmental 
concerns” (Senia 31).   
 NYPIRG was independently funded and professionally staffed and directed by 
recent college graduates whose main responsibilities consisted of maintaining control of  
the quality of work carried out by the students. The aim of the organization was to 
“represent a well-defined student constituency on specific political issues” which were 
chosen ideally through student interest (Senia 32); however, most of the more intensive, 
attention-yielding projects consisted of uncovering sales and tax frauds in order to protect 
the consumer. Among the more notable of these projects in the 1970s were the consumer 
price surveys that exposed the incompetence of hearing aid sales in Queens, NY, the 
overcharge of prescriptions medications in lower income areas of New York, as well as 
the exposure of property tax inequities within the state. Also of wide appeal were the 
comparison of local supermarket prices in the state (Senia 32). 
 These findings prompted and informed specific legislation and litigation battles to 
essentially provide greater state regulation of the economy and protect NYPIRG’s 
constituents: the consumers. Student reports were released to the public via available 
media outlets to raise public awareness of the investigated issues.  
 Ultimately, the PIRGs represent a rather radical shift in student activism in the 
1970s, a time in which the growing popularity of neoliberal policy was unleashing market 
forces while breaking apart social safety nets and solidarities and shaping a cultural ethos 
of individual ascendancy. The PIRGs serve as a particularly successful subset of a 
growing activist trend toward the formulation of special interest groups to represent an 
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increasingly fractioned and specialized public. In this proliferating method, inequalities 
and injustices are pursued at the legislative level through the frame of the consumer and 
individual rights. Activism, hence, is slimmed down; it becomes efficient and practical, a 
non-profit business offering full-time careers to duke it out with other businesses on the 
presumably equitable stage of the state and in the name of a public of consumers.  
 This phenomenon has become more pronounced over the last decade, as PIRG 
student chapters have diminished in influence—confined to more local and campus-
specific issues--and professionally staffed state PIRG offices have become more 
prominent on the national radar.  
 
The Non-Profit Enterprise and the Commodification of Social Activism 
 The PIRGs stand out as a particularly concrete example of the way in which 
social change and activism was broadly reframed at the onset of the neoliberal project in 
the 1970s; activism—shaped by, as Levine and Wilson put it, a growing sense of 
individual ascendancy—was trimmed down to a legislative arm representing a 
multifarious public divided among a number of specific interests and issues. This public, 
however, is broadly cast as individual consumers whose interests and choice must be 
protected; the projects most often taken up are decidedly fiscally-oriented; and though the 
popular methods to enact change alter slightly through the decades, they remain 
strikingly corporatist, business-savvy, and consumer-concerned. The activist shift, then, 
most clearly represented by PIRG in the 1970s, reflects the ways that the rampant 
deregulation, privatization, and business-ethic of the 70s and consequent decades actively 
reshaped the way the public is conceptualized in relation to the state and economy.  
  
20 
No more clearly is this reconceptualization apparent than in the juxtaposition of 
U.S. PIRG’s tagline, in which the organization proclaims itself an “independent voice for 
consumers”, and PIRG’s mission statement, proudly advertised on their website: 
 
U.S. PIRG, the federation of state Public Interest Research Groups (PIRGs), 
stands up to powerful special interests on behalf of the American public, working 
to win concrete results for our health and well-being. With a strong network of  
researchers, advocates, organizers, and students in state capitols across the 
country, we take on the special interests on issues such as product safety, public 
health, political corruption, tax and budget reform and consumer protection, 
where these interests stand in the way of reform and progress (U.S. PIRG). 
 
 Thus, the PIRGs tout themselves as a combative interest group for the consumer, 
standing up to other powerful interest groups on behalf of the American public. There is 
conflation between the “public” and the “consumer” that is critical in understanding and 
analyzing the terms of activism since the 1970s and the ways in which the more 
successful methods of social change operate, often gaining critical political and economic 
influence through wielding the identity of the consumer and employing consumerist 
techniques to advance causes. The public, then, is conceptualized as consumers and 
engaged with as consumers. 
 
PIRG Campaigns 
 This conflation is obvious in the rhetoric of most of PIRG’s current leading 
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campaigns. “Standing up for the public on health care” means advocating for a “pro-
consumer health care exchange” in which the economic units of the “family and business 
join together and negotiate for cheaper health care plans” (U.S. PIRG). “Putting public 
health ahead of big ag” translates to cutting federal corn subsidies to large agribusinesses 
as they affect the quality of food choices for consumers (U.S. PIRG). Though the rhetoric 
of the public and the consumer is more subtle in the campaign against corn subsidies, the 
campaign is couched in concerns for public health as it pertains to obesity and diabetes; 
the obesity epidemic is strategically connected to the proliferation of cheap “junk foods” 
made possible in part by corn subsidies to large agribusinesses like Cargill and Monsanto. 
Thus, the argument to end federal corn subsidies gains most of its strength from the 
demand to “stop subsidizing obesity” and protect public health by improving the quality 
of food choices for consumers (U.S. PIRG).  
 Other major campaigns include “reclaiming our democracy” through curbing the 
influence of large corporations in government. A main component of this campaign is 
lobbying with shareholders in large corporations, like Target or Bank of America, that are 
making or will potentially make large political contributions. This effort includes support 
of the Shareholder Protection Act, “a bill that would require corporations to seek the 
explicit approval of shareholders before spending a dime in electoral politics” (U.S. 
PIRG). Thus, this approach influences corporations through holding them accountable to 
their shareholders, or, as economist Joseph Farrell calls them, “owner-consumers” (1). 
Another facet of this campaign is a concerted attempt to rival corporate interest monies in 
politics through increasing public interest monies by encouraging greater numbers of 
contributions from individual citizens. Again, these campaigns advance their fights for 
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the “public” through framing that fight in terms of the consumer and drowning out 
corporate interest groups by beating them at their own game.  
 The way the PIRGs present themselves publicly, as well, lends to the idea of 
consumerism, with bracing taglines like “U.S. PIRG: Standing up to Powerful Interests” 
emblazoned on the homepage of the website (U.S. PIRG). Involvement with PIRG is 
streamlined, quick, and convenient, as advertised on their donations page where 
“supporting U.S. PIRG is quick and easy” as the donor can enter the amount and credit 
card information in the blanks below (U.S. PIRG). To “Take Action” on an issue, after 
having read an impassioned synopsis of its terms, the individual need only sign their 
name and contact information to a pre-fabricated card to the appropriate legislator. For 
example, an individual reads the synopsis of the potential increase in student loan interest 
rates this Summer: 
 
 In July, interest rates will DOUBLE on subsidized Stafford student loans that 
 almost 8 million students use to pay for school. This will cause some borrowers to 
 pay almost $5000 more on their loan over a 10-year repayment (U.S. PIRG). 
 
That individual can then channel any indignation by attaching her name and contact 
information to the following message: 
 
 Dear [Decision Maker], 
 Please support a plan to stop student loan interest rates from doubling this   
 July.  
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 Almost 8 million students use subsidized Stafford loans to pay for school   
 and make it to graduation. Without a new plan, the students who borrow   
 the maximum amount of subsidized Stafford loans could pay almost $5000  
 more through the repayment of their loan. Students cannot shoulder such a  
 huge increase in this economy.  
 Please support the plan to stop student loan interest rates from doubling   
 this July! 
Sincerely,  
 [Your Name] 
 [Your Address] 
 [City, State ZIP] 
 
These methods, obviously, are not altogether bad, but it is critical to remark upon the 
ways in which large social justice organizations represent themselves and engage the 
public they purport to represent. For PIRG, public involvement entails legislative 
lobbying by individuals and donations to the organization to fund state PIRG offices. The 
greatest involvement in the campaigns and politics of the organization comes from the 
paid staff at various state PIRG offices across the country as well as in the capitol, 
Washington, D.C. The staff positions range from being a state campaign director, whose 
tasks include “creat[ing] and implement[ing] winning campaign strategies” in line with 
the principles of the organization, ultimately operating as the face for the state PIRG 
chapter, to being a campus organizer, rallying student volunteers around local causes, 
also corresponding to the organization’s vested interests (U.S. PIRG). Broad public 
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engagement, then, is trimmed down and streamlined while the majority of political 
involvement rests upon a hired staff. 
  Thus, not only does the conflation between the “public” and the 
“consumer” affect the way in which issues pursued by the organization are termed, but 
the seemingly interchangeable nature of the “public” and the “consumer” changes how 
civil society and the individual are perceived, influencing the way in which activist 
organizations fundamentally operate. Social justice becomes a full-time career and 
involvement from the general public is streamlined, made convenient; in understanding 
the public as the consumer, social and political engagement and activism is, in a way, 
advertised and sold. Nowhere is this phenomenon more apparent than in PIRGs’ 
affiliation with The Fund for the Public Interest, their external funding organization and 
the source of the majority of the organization’s “one-on-one interactions” with the 
general public.  
 
The Fund for the Public Interest   
 Much of the state PIRGs’ funding for causes like cutting federal corn subsidies as 
well as their grassroots “one-on-one” education is outsourced to the non-profit 
canvassing organization, the Fund for the Public Interest (the Fund). In fact, the PIRGs 
could be understood as one organization under the umbrella of the larger Fund for the 
Public interest network, which includes other special interest organizations like the 
Human Rights Campaign, Environmental Action, and Environment America. Though 
each organization is autonomous, they form a coalition sharing the canvassing resources 
that the Fund provides. Often, full-time state PIRG staff works in the same office as the 
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Fund canvassing directors and canvassers, as is the case at the Columbus office in Ohio.  
 The Fund’s purpose, expounded on their website, optimistically highlights their 
mission as a fund-raising and advocacy group for non-profits: 
  
 The Fund helps organizations win today and build for tomorrow. And we do this 
 the old-fashioned way: through one-on-one interactions (The Fund for the Public 
 Interest).  
  
More specifically, through canvassing efforts, the Fund aims to “increase the visibility, 
membership and political power of the nation’s leading environmental and progressive 
groups” (The Fund for the Public Interest). This goal mainly equates to fundraising as 
well as petitioning. 
 The Fund has several offices in numerous states and cities across the country. The 
offices are usually managed by a single canvassing director and one or more assistant 
canvassing directors whose main objective is to grow the office, or hire and retain an 
optimal number of canvassers underneath them. The directors and the canvassers (if they 
remain on staff) work for a number of organizations’ campaigns that change over the 
months, stressing the need to hire staff with deft sales skills more than interest or passion 
in the cause. Indeed, canvassers for the Fund are held to a daily quota of over $120 and 
are given a three-day span of time to hit that quota; individual canvasser commission is 
made on all money raised in addition to the quota. It is this emphasis on fundraising 
standards in the Fund that troubles the notion of canvassing as the PIRGs’ main vein of 
direct public engagement and one-on-one interaction.  
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 Because the employee retention revolves around fundraising numbers, canvassers 
for PIRG (as well as all Fund-associated organizations) are most often sent to middle or 
upper middle class neighborhoods to knock on doors. Information about the campaign is 
relayed through “raps” whose chief purpose is to incite the donor to contribute and/or 
become a member (for a small fee). Thus, one-on-one education, one of the primary tools 
for advocacy and visibility for the organization, generally devolves into a sales pitch, 
catering to simplicity and emotion and aimed at a subset of the population more capable 
and inclined to consume.  
 
The Human Rights Campaign 
 This trend of couching issues in terms of the consumer and employing 
consumerist methods to advance those issues, essentially commodifying social activism, 
is evident in a multitude of special interests lobbyist groups spawned in the 70s or shortly 
thereafter. The Human Rights Campaign, another organization associated with the Fund, 
has become the popular face for the twenty-first century’s gay equality politics. This is a 
politics, as Lisa Duggan points out, fundamentally based in gaining wider mainstream 
acceptance for gays and lesbians rather than making any broad-based or poignant 
critiques of a system that has actively excluded them; it seeks change through 
conceptualizing homosexuals as viable consumers within the neoliberal market 
landscape. As Duggan argues in regards to a similar gay rights organization, the 
Independent Gay Forum (IGF): 
 
 The new neoliberal sexual politics of IGF might be termed the new 
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 homonormativity--it is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative 
 assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the 
 possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay 
 culture anchored in domesticity and consumption (Duggan 50).  
 
Thus, the issues advanced by the Human Rights Campaign center on gay marriage or 
“marriage equality” and the ability for homosexuals to serve openly in the military.  
 The methods enacted by HRC are decidedly corporatist. The organization has a 
legion of corporate sponsors supporting their issues, including Macy’s, American 
Airlines, and Coca-Cola. Activism and social justice, then, defined by HRC, can be used 
to endorse products; it becomes a brand companies can employ to entice individuals to 
consume. The public can then show support for “marriage equality” through donating 
directly to HRC or shopping at one of their many corporate sponsors. Social justice and 
activism, defined narrowly in terms of the consumer, becomes something you can wear, 
something that you are sold.  
 The challenge of gaining funds for non-profit lobbyist groups like the PIRGs and 
HRC not only contributes to the consumerist nature of their activism but also leads 
inadvertently to labor exploitation.  Contrary to the messages of economic and social 
justice touted by organizations like the PIRGs and HRC, their fundraising raising arm, 
the Fund for the Public Interest, has been riddled for several years by labor issues; 
indeed, the Fund has become notorious for various labor abuses. In an effort to cut the 
costs of operation for the organization, employees are often expected to work long hours 
and personally shoulder some of the expenses incurred by the organization.  
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 This commonplace practice for the Fund is evidenced in a multitude of reviews 
written by former employees on glassdoor.com, a website designed to increase 
transparency of various companies’ labor practices for potential employees. As one 
Citizen Outreach director, warns: “the hours are 60-80 a week, and the pay is as low as 
the state allows” (Glassdoor). Another former director laments the 60-80 hour work-week 
at a salary of $24,000 as well as the Fund’s expectation to “pay out of pocket for things 
like gas, travel, and other work-related expenses” (Glassdoor). Indeed, all twenty-eight 
reviews written by former employees for the Fund continue in a strikingly similar vein.  
 Complaints such as these have incited some employees of the Fund to unionize, 
demanding more realistic fundraising standards and better job security as well as 
reasonable payment for hours worked. Unionizing attempts, however, have been met with 
austerity measures and refusals to negotiate on behalf of Fund management. In 2005, Los 
Angeles Fund employees who voted to unionize were fired, the upper management 
refused to negotiate terms and put a freeze on new hiring in the high turn-over workplace. 
After the union vote, the Los Angeles office was eventually closed altogether (Mirk). 
More recently, in 2011 employees at a Fund call center in Portland, Oregon voted 19-5 to 
form a union with another canvassing organization. Two of the three workers appointed 
to negotiate bargaining terms were then systematically fired after which the fledgling 
union staged a walkout from the office. The action drew over 100 supporters who 
protested outside of the Fund office, flouting signs imploring the Oregon PIRG’s chapter 
as well as the state’s Environment America chapter to “tell the Fund to practice what you 
preach” (Mirk).  
 The modus operandi, then, for some of the more successful and established social 
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justice organizations, like the PIRGs and the Human Rights Campaign, seems to be 
couching social change in the interest of a consumerist public, pursuing their causes 
singularly through the state, and engaging the public through strikingly consumerist 
means; funding legislative battles often necessitates the outsourcing of tasks to 
specialized fundraising and visibility organizations, like the Fund for the Public Interest, 
in which commissioned canvassers are briefed on a specific issue and rewarded generally 
based upon financial standards (how much money raised). Canvassers and directors 
employed by the Fund and, by association, PIRG and HRC, are largely treated as a labor 
commodity, disposable and secondary to monetary objectives. 
  All this has the effect of commodifying social activism and narrowing the field of 
social justice to making legislative changes on behalf of a constituency of consumers. 
Activist organizations become businesses where labor is used to advance causes and 
reach out to a subset of the public most able to consume. Thus, though the PIRGs seat 
their fight in economic justice and beating back corporate interests, their consumerist 
methods and rhetoric--shaped by a political, social, economic background of neoliberal 
corporatism--serve mainly to reinscribe the economic and social hierarchies advanced by 
the neoliberal capitalist project.  
 
Conclusion: Barriers to Radical Social Change 
 Lobbyist and litigation organizations like the PIRGs are representative of what 
activism and civic engagement has largely looked like in Bauman’s “second modernity” 
(3). The radical liberation of market forces under the institution of neoliberal theory in 
the 1970s has required the liquefaction of collectivities through valorizing the concepts of 
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privatization and personal responsibility (having disproportionate affects on the 
population along lines of class, race, gender, and sexuality). This tactic has given way to 
a rise in individual ascendancy, stressing the primacy of the individual over the 
community and conceptualizing individual freedom in terms of the consumer. This 
emergence of what Margaret Thatcher described as “a society of individuals” has had a 
profound impact on mainstream methods of social change as the interests of civil society 
have been divided among a multitude of special interest groups, concerned with 
improving conditions for specific groups of people (quoted in Harvey 23); singular issues 
are then taken up through the state on behalf of constituencies often understood in terms 
of the consumer.  
 Large lobbyist efforts, then, are advanced through couching the public interest in 
terms of consumer interests and engaging with the public on those terms. Organizations 
like the PIRGs and HRC become decidedly business-like as civic engagement is 
streamlined into petitions and donations and campaigns are funded at the expense of fair 
labor practices. This approach to social change has the effect of commodifying social 
activism, rendering civic engagement as something to be advertised and consumed. 
Activism in this way works well within the neoliberal agenda, in which individual 
freedom usually devolves to advocacy for greater consumer choice in an expanding 
market underpinned by hierarchies of class, race, gender, and sexuality. Specifically, 
lobbyist activism in the vein of the PIRGs and HRC affects public political engagement 
in three interrelated ways that stunt its potential for inciting radical social change in the 
current system.  
 First, as an upward redistribution of resources seems to be the most persistent 
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characteristic of neoliberalism, massive economic inequalities are then inevitable. As 
David Harvey puts it: 
 
 there is abundant evidence that neoliberal theory and rhetoric (particularly the  
 political rhetoric concerning liberty and freedom) has also all along primarily 
 functioned as a mask for practices that are all about the maintenance, 
 reconstitution, and restoration of elite class power (Harvey 188).  
 
Thus, engaging the public as consumers and representing them as such has the effect of 
relegating social activism to a subset of the population most able and inclined to 
consume, namely the middle and upper classes. Understanding activism in terms of 
consumerism has the effect of reinscribing the social and economic hierarchies endemic 
to the capitalist order.  
 Second, the splintered nature of activism through the development of special 
interest lobbyist groups like the PIRGs and HRC obscures the ways in which social and 
economic inequalities are fundamentally interrelated. Indeed, Lisa Duggan argues that the 
most common and critical fault for contemporary social movements and social justice 
organizations is an inability to see the connections and interrelations among the political, 
the economic, and the cultural; the front for contemporary leftist politics, then, appears 
fractured along a divide between economic/class politics and identity/cultural politics. 
Representing very specific interests and pursuing singular issues—like the PIRGs with 
economic justice or the Human Rights Campaign with gay rights—hinders understanding 
of how identity issues are inextricably tied to issues of class and economics.  
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 For example, the reduction of federal social safety nets and collective bargaining 
groups advanced through the concepts of privatization and personal responsibility have 
had an uneven affect on civil society, especially along the lines of race, sexuality, and 
gender. As Lisa Duggan puts it: 
 
social service functions are privatized through personal responsibility as the 
proper functions of the state are narrowed, tax and wage costs in the economy are 
cut, and more social costs are absorbed by civil society and the family. In 
addition, this redistribution of costs and benefits has been starkly differentiated by 
hierarchies of race, gender, and sexuality (Duggan 17). 
 
This phenomenon is evident in the welfare reforms of the 1990s, as they 
disproportionately affected poor women and children through advancing policies with a 
vested interest in the heterosexual, patriarchal family structure and sexual propriety. 
These policies included “‘family caps’ to limit support for newborns, mandatory child 
support cooperation even in cases of domestic violence, family planning and adoption 
relinquishment incentives, and sexual abstinence education” (Duggan 16). Thus, the 
neoliberal economic project of market liberalization through valorizing concepts of 
privatization and personal responsibility is cut through with issues of identity, as Duggan 
succinctly describes: 
 
In neoliberal discourse, married women are assumed to be responsible for 
children and dependent on wage-earning husbands, and are often advised to stay 
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at home during their children’s early years to build self-esteem and independence 
in the young. They are also encouraged to volunteer, as the bulwarks of civil 
society and “faith-based” social service provisions, with their unpaid labor 
underpinning the privatized social safety net. Single, divorced, and widowed 
women may “choose” to work in a gender and race-segmented labor market 
without affordable childcare or public assistance in order to build their self-
esteem and independence—or, some welfare reformers suggest, they may 
“choose” to put their children up for adoption by married couples, or house them 
in orphanages (Duggan 17).  
 
Effective social activism, then, must be able to engage with economic inequalities as they 
are related to issues of identity; special interest lobbyist groups invested in consumerist 
rhetoric and methods serve to divide activism into singular, discrete issues to be tackled 
through the state one at a time, disabling the ability to analyze how inequalities are 
affiliated. 
 Third, through pursuing issues entirely through the legislative system of the state 
and consequently engaging the public largely with the intent of fundraising and 
petitioning, the scope of civic, democratic engagement and analysis is narrowed. 
Individuals can count themselves as politically and socially involved through donating to 
the PIRGs or petitioning a legislator while the organization’s staff brings issues to the 
attention of federal law-makers. Streamlining political and social involvement in this way 
and appealing, ultimately, to state power and authority to incite change cripples the 
possibility for more broad-based social and political engagement and multi-faceted 
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analytical approaches to social change.  
 According to David Harvey, the objectives of creating greater social equality and 
eradicating social ills like “’poverty, illiteracy, or disease’. . . cannot be realized without 
challenging the fundamental power bases upon which neoliberalism has been built and to 
which the processes of neoliberalization have so lavishly contributed” (Harvey 187). This 
includes recognizing the ways in which the neoliberal agenda of increasing capital 
accumulation is advanced through class and identity politics and has a way of 
reconceptualizing freedom in terms individualism and consumerism. Radical social 
change, then, requires an inclusive approach that engages people at all levels of the 
economic spectrum and works through multiple venues of activism. As Lisa Duggan 
describes it: 
 
 Only an interconnected, analytically diverse, cross-fertilizing and expansive left 
 can seize this moment to lead us elsewhere, to newly imagined possibilities for 
 equality in the 21st century (Duggan xxii). 
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